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Abstract
We propose a model of preferences in which the effect of randomization on am-
biguity depends on how the unknown probability law is determined. We adopt the
framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and relax the axioms. In the resulting
representation of the individual’s preference, the individual has a collection of sets of
priorsM. She believes that before she moves, nature has chosen an unknown scenario
(a set of priors) from M, and from that scenario, nature will choose a prior after she
moves. The representation illustrates how randomization may partially eliminate the
effect of ambiguity.
∗Department of Economics, University of Michigan. Email: shaoweik@umich.edu.
†ByteDance. Email: qizhang.berkeley@gmail.com.
‡We thank the, three anonymous referees, Nemanja Antić, Tilman Börgers, Gabriel Carroll, Xiaoyu
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1 Introduction
It is often assumed in economics that an individual has a unique subjective prior (probability
measure) over states of the world, even though the true probability law—if one is already
determined—is rarely provided. Ellsberg (1961) introduces intuitive thought experiments to
show that, on the contrary, an individual usually faces ambiguity and is ambiguity-averse;
that is, she does not have a unique prior and dislikes betting on an event without a unique
subjective probability assessment. In one experiment, assuming that a correct bet yields
$100 and a wrong bet $0, it is predicted that an individual facing a risky urn (that contains
50 red and 50 black balls) and an ambiguous urn (with 100 red and black balls, but in an
unknown proportion) will prefer to bet on the color of a randomly drawn ball from the risky
urn over that from the ambiguous urn. Nonetheless, fixing any urn, the individual will be
indifferent between betting on either color of a randomly drawn ball.1 This prediction is
confirmed by many subsequent studies.
In a seminal paper, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) introduce the maxmin expected utility
(MEU) model to capture ambiguity aversion. In the model, the individual has multiple
priors. To evaluate a choice object, such as a bet, she adopts the prior that minimizes its
utility; to choose from multiple choice objects, she maximizes the minimum utility.2 The
interpretation is that with multiple priors in mind, the individual is conservative and focuses
on the worst-case scenario—or, equivalently, it is as if the individual believes that nature
plays against her by choosing the worst probability law from a fixed set of laws.
The MEU model, or more generally the maxmin principle, has been useful in various areas
of economics: contract theory, mechanism design, macroeconomics, finance, etc.3 Surpris-
1This implies that the individual must not have a unique prior, even if we consider (subjective) non-
expected utility models (see Machina and Schmeidler (1992)).
2In the previous experiment, suppose the individual has three priors about the composition of the am-
biguous urn: The number of red balls is either 30, 50, or 70. Then, to evaluate the bet on red (black) drawn
from the ambiguous urn, she believes that there are only 30 red (black) balls.
3See, among many others, Hansen and Sargent (2010); Bergemann and Schlag (2011); Antić (2014);
Easley, O’Hara, and Yang (2014); Di Tillio, Kos, and Messner (2017); and Carrasco, Farinha Luz, Kos,
Messner, Monteiro, and Moreira (2018). In the MEU model, minimization is over the individual’s multiple
priors. The maxmin principle has also been adopted when minimization is based on regret, over multiple
1
ingly, however, in these applications, it is usually unclear how a basic concept in economics,
randomization/mixed strategies, should be modeled when an individual behaves according
to the MEU model or any other maxmin criterion.4 Randomization is modeled differently
in different applications or simply ruled out; sometimes a discussion of the difficulty of in-
troducing randomization and various ways to model randomization is provided, but there
is not yet a general principle that helps us better understand how randomization should be
modeled in a given application.5
In this paper, we introduce a theory of randomization under ambiguity that may help
address this issue. We focus on (randomization under) the MEU model, but the insights we
derive may be applied to other ambiguity models and models with other maxmin criteria.
1.1 How Should Randomization Eliminate the Effect of Ambigu-
ity?
Suppose there are two services, A and B. An individual needs to purchase one of them.
There are two states, sA and sB. In state sA (sB), service A (B) yields payoff 1 and the
other service yields 0. Both services seem equally good to the individual, but similar to the
urn experiment, the individual does not have a unique probability assessment of sA or sB.
Now, suppose the actual probability of sA and sB depends on some details of the services
unknown to the individual. Consider two situations. In the first, those details are precisely
stated in contracts, although the individual never plans to read them. In the second, service
providers do not explain those details in contracts. If the individual chooses the services
randomly, will randomization interact with ambiguity in any way in either situation?
To understand the answer to this question, we first return to the urn experiment, in
which the individual is indifferent between betting on red and black being drawn from the
mechanisms, over multiple production technologies, over opponents’ preferences, etc.
4In the literature on ambiguity, two types of mixture operations have been studied. Here, by randomiza-
tion, we mean the mixture operation implemented before the state is revealed to the individual. In Section
2.1, we will introduce the other type of mixture operation, state-wise randomization.
5See Section 5 for more details.
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ambiguous urn. Raiffa (1961) points out that randomization renders ambiguity irrelevant.
Suppose the individual tosses a fair coin, and bets on red being drawn from the ambiguous
urn if heads and black if tails. Then, no matter what the number of red/black balls is in
the ambiguous urn and which color is drawn, the individual will bet on red and black with
equal probability; that is, she always receives a 50-50 lottery between $100 and $0 (see the
right-hand side of Figure 1), which is what she will receive if she bets on red/black being
drawn from the risky urn.6 Therefore, if randomization is perceived in this way, ambiguity
becomes irrelevant.
However, randomization can be viewed in other ways. A popular alternative view (the
left-hand side of Figure 1) is as follows: Regardless of the outcome of the coin toss, the
individual must bet on either red or black being drawn from the ambiguous urn; that is,
after the coin toss, she always ends up with a bet from the ambiguous urn that she dislikes in
the first place. As Saito (2015) argues, if ambiguity is perceived in this way, its effect should
be unaffected by randomization. To date, in applications that apply the maxmin principle,























Figure 1: There are two states, in which sR (sB) means that red (black) is drawn from the
ambiguous urn. Randomization is represented by solid lines, with “R” (“B”) representing
betting on red (black). The number along a solid line indicates the objective probability of
betting on the corresponding color.
6The right-hand side of Figure 1 is in fact a simplified version of this idea. See Figure 3.
7See Section 5 for a more detailed discussion.
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A few papers have noted that the main difference between the two views lies in subjective
timing.8 This is easier to explain under the MEU model. Suppose the individual believes
that the number of red balls in the ambiguous urn is either 30 or 70. Recall that an as-if
interpretation of the MEU model is that the individual believes that nature plays against
her. Does she believe that she randomizes before nature moves or after? If she believes that
she moves first, nature can choose the probability law based on the outcome of the coin toss :
If heads (betting on red), the number of red balls will be 30; otherwise, it is 70. Either way,
the individual’s bet will be correct with only 30% chance. This is consistent with the second
view: Regardless of the outcome of the coin toss, the individual is affected by ambiguity as
in the case without the coin.
This is not true, however, if the individual believes that nature moves first. If nature
moves first, although the number of red balls is unknown, it cannot depend on the outcome
of the coin toss. Suppose the fixed number of red balls is 30. If heads, the individual’s bet
will be correct with 30% chance; otherwise, it will be correct with 70% chance. Overall,
the individual’s bet will be correct with 50% chance. The same applies if the fixed number
of red balls is 70. Therefore, this is consistent with the first view: Fixing an arbitrary
number of red balls, the coin toss always gives the individual a 50-50 lottery between $100
and $0. Thus, the interaction between randomization and ambiguity should depend on the
individual’s belief about how the unknown probability law is determined.
Now, return to the service example. In the first situation, before the individual random-
izes, the contracts have pinned down the probability of sA and sB, although the probability is
unknown to the individual. This is similar to the case in which the number of red balls does
not depend on the outcome of the coin toss, and hence the view that randomization renders
ambiguity irrelevant is more suitable. In the second situation without contracts, it seems
more plausible that the effect of ambiguity is unaffected by randomization: The individual
8Among others, see Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007); Bade (2015); Saito (2015); Baillon, Halevy,
and Li (2019); and Oechssler, Rau, and Roomets (2019). Note that subjective timing does not have to be
identical to objective timing (if there is any).
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may worry that after randomization and choosing a service, the details of the service will
still be manipulated in a way against her.
In the service example, first, there is a natural objective timing of when the probability
law is determined. This is often not the case, and even if there is a natural objective timing,
the individual is free to hold a different view. Second, the timing is extreme, in the sense that
the probability law is completely pinned down either before randomization or after. Again,
this rarely happens in practice. For example, in the first situation of the service example,
if contracts use words that can be interpreted in many ways, and “The service provider
reserves all rights for final explanation” is added to both contracts, how does it change the
individual’s view of randomization?
Similarly, consider a stylized investment example in which the individual can either long
or short a firm. Suppose she believes that the probability that the firm succeeds depends
on some unknown long-term factor that has been determined and some unknown short-term
factor that will be determined after she makes a decision. How should randomization interact
with ambiguity?
1.2 Preview of Results
To study randomization under ambiguity, we adopt the choice domain of Anscombe and Au-
mann (1963) (henceforth AA) and analyze an individual’s preference.9 The domain consists
of lotteries over acts (lotteries for short henceforth; see Figure 2). A lottery is a probability
measure (mixed strategy) over acts. An act assigns to each state of the world a prize. A
prize is a probability measure over consequences. Note that this domain does not require
that we describe objectively how the probability law is determined; this will be subjective
and revealed from the individual’s preference.
We incorporate ideas from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and first- and second-order
9We use the original AA choice domain that has two types of mixture operations. In many papers using
the AA choice domain, only one mixture operation, which will be called state-wise randomization in our















Figure 2: A lottery P that yields act f with probability P (f) and act g with P (g), in which
fi (gi) is the prize associated with state si by f (g).
stochastic dominance to relax AA’s axioms. Our main theorem characterizes the following
representation of the individual’s preference over lotteries, the double maxmin expected utility
(DMEU) representation: For each lottery P ,












in which each M ∈ M is a set of priors, and u(f(s)) is the utility of the prize that an act
f assigns to state s. Each M ∈ M is called a scenario. The individual believes that before
she randomizes, nature, which plays against her, has chosen a scenario (although unknown
to her) from M. After she randomizes, nature will choose a prior µ from that scenario.
Figures 3–5 illustrate how the DMEU representation describes the individual’s belief
about the determination of the unknown probability law and about the interaction between
randomization and ambiguity. Figure 3 depicts the urn experiment assuming that the indi-
vidual believes that the number of red balls is determined before she randomizes and hence
randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity. This DMEU representation has two sce-
narios and each scenario has only one probability law. Figure 4 depicts the urn experiment
assuming that the individual believes that the number of red balls is determined after she


































Figure 3: There are two scenarios. For example, (0.3, 0.7) is the scenario with 30 red balls
and 70 black balls in the ambiguous urn. There is only one prior in each scenario. In state
sR (sB), the ball drawn is red (black). In each scenario, randomization and state revelation
constitute a compound lottery that yields $100 and $0 with equal probability.






















Figure 4: The only scenario contains two priors (either 30 or 70 red balls in the ambiguous
urn). The worst prior within the scenario depends on the realization of randomization.
Figure 5 is the investment example, in which the probability that the firm succeeds
depends on some unknown long-term and short-term factors. This example shows that
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randomization may partially eliminate the effect of ambiguity—it helps eliminate the effect of
ambiguity across scenarios, but not across probability laws within a scenario. The individual
believes that one unknown scenario inM = {MG,MN ,MB} has occured before she chooses.
Scenarios MG (good long-term factor) and MB (bad long-term factor) are singletons—the
long-term factor alone determines the probability law. In scenario MN , how likely the firm
is to succeed also depends on the short-term factor, which is not yet determined. In this
case, randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity across scenarios MG and MB, but not
within MN .
10
Next, we discuss the related literature; additional discussion can be found in Section 5.
The closest paper to ours is Saito (2015). Saito also studies an axiomatic model in which
the ambiguity-averse individual may have a preference for randomization. His model uses
a convex combination to combine the two extreme timing beliefs—the belief that nature
moves completely before the individual randomizes and the belief that nature moves com-
pletely after. We will show that his model is a special case of ours. In addition to models of
ambiguity aversion, there are other models of preference for randomization under different
choice domains with different motivations, such as Machina (1985); Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillen-
berger, and Ortoleva (2015); Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015); and Cerreia-Vioglio,
Dillenberger, Ortoleva, and Riella (2019), among others.
Several papers have also examined representations of preferences that involve collections
of sets of priors. Lehrer and Teper (2011) study a representation called the multiple multiple-
priors representation, which allows for violations of completeness and transitivity. Frick,
Iijima, and Le Yaouanq (2019) propose the Boolean expected utility representation, in which
the belief the individual uses to evaluate an act is the most pessimistic prior from the most
optimistic set of priors.
Empirical studies have examined whether individuals strictly prefer to randomize. For
example, Dominiak and Schnedler (2011); Agranov and Ortoleva (2017); Dwenger, Kübler,
10A more detailed discussion follows Theorem 2.
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MN = {(0.7, 0.3),













































Figure 5: In the good scenario MG, the firm will profit (state sp) with probability 1. In
the bad scenario MB, the firm will profit with probability 0. In the neutral scenario MN ,
the probability that the firm profits is either 0.3 or 0.7, which will be determined after
randomization.
and Weizsäcker (2018); and Oechssler et al. (2019). Many of them find a nonnegligible
number of individuals who strictly prefer to randomize, but some do not. This is consistent
with our theory: The individual may strictly prefer to randomize in some choice problems
but not in others, and how desirable randomization appears to her depends on her timing
beliefs.
Preference for randomization is also an important topic in preference elicitation in ex-
periments. Indeed, our main idea that the individual’s evaluation of a lottery depends on
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her belief about how the unknown probability law is determined has also appeared in the
research on random incentive mechanisms. Bade (2015) and Baillon et al. (2019) argue that
ambiguity-averse participants may use the randomization device to hedge, and thus the in-
centive compatibility of the random incentive mechanism may be affected. Kuzmics (2017)
also points out the difficulty of preference elicitation when individuals face ambiguity: Indi-
viduals with nonsubjective-expected-utility preferences may end up behaving as if they are
subjective-expected-utility maximizers.
Finally, many papers have studied ambiguity and robustness in different areas of eco-
nomics. As mentioned earlier, how mixed strategies should be introduced and evaluated has
been an issue. Our results offer some new insights into this issue. We leave the detailed
discussion to the end of the paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the choice domain, mixture opera-
tions, and a variant of AA’s characterization of the subjective expected utility representation.
Section 3 presents the main axioms, the DMEU representation, and the main results. Section
4 examines three special cases of the DMEU. Section 5 discusses the related literature.
2 Preliminaries
The set of consequences is a compact Polish space X .11 Let ∆(X ) be the set of Borel
probability measures on X , endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Elements of
∆(X ) are called prizes. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be a finite set of states. An act f : S → ∆(X )
is a function that assigns a prize to each state. For each state si, we write fi instead of f(si)
for simplicity. Let F denote the set of all acts, endowed with the product topology. Let
∆(F), the set of Borel probability measures on F , denote the set of all lotteries, endowed
with the topology of weak convergence. Henceforth, when we say a set of acts, we mean a
Borel measurable subset of F . The support of a lottery P ∈ ∆(F), denoted by supp(P ),
is the smallest closed set of acts F ⊂ F such that P (F ) = 1. The individual has a binary
11A Polish space is a complete separable metric space.
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relation/preference% on ∆(F). We denote the asymmetric part of% by and the symmetric
part by ∼.
A lottery represents randomization over acts. Following randomization, the individual
receives an act. Next, a state is revealed to the individual, after which the act assigns the
prize associated with the realized state to the individual. Finally, as the prize’s risk resolves,
the individual receives a consequence (see Figure 2).
Lotteries are denoted by P,Q,R, acts are denoted by f, g, h, and prizes are denoted by
p, q, r. A degenerate lottery that assigns probability 1 to an act f is identified with f . If
an act yields the same prize p in all states, the act is called a constant act, and is identified
with p. If a prize assigns probability 1 to a consequence x, we denote the prize by δx.
We assume throughout the paper that % is nontrivial: There exist some lotteries P and
Q such that P  Q.
2.1 Randomization and State-wise Randomization
We distinguish between two kinds of mixture operations. First, the randomization between
lotteries P and Q with probability α ∈ [0, 1], denoted by αP + (1 − α)Q, is a lottery that
assigns probability αP (F ) + (1 − α)Q(F ) to each set of acts F ⊂ F . The second kind of
mixture operation is state by state and for acts. The state-wise randomization between acts
f and g with probability α ∈ [0, 1], denoted by αf +sw (1 − α)g, is an act that assigns the
prize αfi + (1− α)gi to each state si (see Figure 6).12
The difference between the two mixture operations is obvious, but one useful way to
understand it is to consider randomization as a mixture performed before the state is revealed
to the individual, and state-wise randomization as a mixture performed after the state is
revealed. In the urn experiment, before a ball is drawn, the individual tosses a fair coin
and bets on red being drawn from the ambiguous urn if heads and black if tails. This is
12Here, αfi + (1− α)gi is the standard mixture between prizes (probability measures over consequences)
used in expected utility theory. With an abuse of notation, this mixture is also denoted by “+.” In most


















↵f1 + (1   ↵)g1
↵f2 + (1   ↵)g2
Figure 6: Suppose there are two states: s1 and s2. The left-hand lottery is the randomization
with probability α between acts (degenerate lotteries) f and g. The right-hand act is the
state-wise randomization with probability α between acts f and g.
randomization and is done before the color of the drawn ball is revealed to the individual.
As discussed in Section 1, whether such randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity
depends on the individual’s subjective timing belief.
In contrast, suppose the individual first observes the color of the ball drawn, and then
tosses the coin and bets accordingly. This will generate an act that yields a 50-50 lottery
between $100 and $0 in all states, sR (red is drawn) and sB (black is drawn), which is exactly
the 50-50 state-wise randomization between betting on red and black (see also the right-hand
side of Figures 1 and 6). Since the prizes are identical in all states, this 50-50 state-wise
randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity, regardless of the individual’s belief about
how the unknown probability law is determined. To put it differently, because the mixture
happens after the state is revealed, nature must have determined the probability law, in
which case the individual’s timing belief no longer matters.
From the above discussion, it can also be seen that under the same mixture probability,
state-wise randomization should be (weakly) more effective in eliminating the effect of ambi-
guity than randomization. Intuitively, under state-wise randomization, nature always moves
before the mixture, and hence it is (weakly) harder for nature to play against the individual
12
than under randomization.
2.2 Subjective Expected Utility
AA provide a characterization of the subjective expected utility (SEU) representation. We
introduce a variant that will be useful in motivating our axioms in Section 3. The first
four axioms are restatements of AA’s axioms and assumptions using our terminology and
notation.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order) The preference % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) For any P ∈ ∆(F), {Q ∈ ∆(F) : Q % P} and {Q ∈ ∆(F) : P % Q}
are closed.
The first two axioms are basic. The next three axioms are the ones we want to relax
later.
Axiom 3 (Independence) For any P,Q,R ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ (0, 1), P % Q if and only if
αP + (1− α)R % αQ+ (1− α)R.
Axiom 4 (State-wise Independence) For any f, g, h ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), f % g if and only
if αf +sw (1− α)h % αg +sw (1− α)h.
To state the last axiom, we need the following notation. For each lottery P , let fP denote





for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and measurable set of consequences X ⊂ X . By construction, the
lottery P is converted into an act fP state by state via reduction of compound lotteries. For
example, suppose the support of P is finite. Fixing any state si, f
P
i is the mixture of prizes
weighted by P ,
∑
f∈supp(P ) P (f) · fi, which is a standard compound lottery in expected
utility theory. To put it differently, if we convert all randomization in P into state-wise
randomization, we obtain fP .
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Axiom 5 (Strong Dominance) For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), if fPi % fQi for any i, then P % Q.
This axiom combines AA’s two axioms, Monotonicity in Prizes and Reversal of Order
in Compound Lotteries. Monotonicity in Prizes requires that for any two acts f and g, if
fi % gi for every i, f % g. Reversal of Order in Compound Lotteries requires that fP ∼ P .
Therefore, Strong Dominance requires that the individual be indifferent between randomiza-
tion and state-wise randomization. The lemma below emphasizes this, and illustrates some
basic relation between Independence, State-wise Independence, and Strong Dominance. All
omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose % satisfies Weak Order. The following statements are true:
1. For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ [0, 1], Strong Dominance implies that αP + (1−α)Q ∼
fαP+(1−α)Q ∼ αfP + (1− α)fQ ∼ αfP +sw (1− α)fQ;
2. Under Strong Dominance, Independence is equivalent to State-wise Independence.
The axioms above characterize the SEU representation. A function u : ∆(X )→ R is an





Let ∆(S) denote the set of probability measures on S.
Definition 1 The individual’s preference % has an SEU representation if there exists a
continuous expected utility function u : ∆(X ) → R and µ ∈ ∆(S) such that the following
function W represents %:








Since we assume that % is nontrivial, implicitly in the definition above, W is not constant.
We will not repeat this for our other representations, but similar implicit assumptions apply
to them as well.
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When % has an SEU representation, the individual is indifferent between randomization
and state-wise randomization, which is reflected in the following equations:

















u(fP ) dµ = W (fP ).
We say that an SEU representation is unique if in (2), u is unique up to a positive affine
transformation and µ is unique. The theorem below restates AA’s main representation result.
Theorem 1 (Anscombe and Aumann (1963)) The individual’s preference % has an SEU
representation if and only if it satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, State-wise
Independence, and Strong Dominance. Furthermore, the SEU representation is unique.
Because Strong Dominance holds, Lemma 1 implies that one of the two axioms, Indepen-
dence or State-wise Independence, is redundant. Stating the theorem in this way, however,
helps us motivate the relaxations we introduce below.
3 Axioms and the Representation
Three axioms will be relaxed. Observing that state-wise randomization may render am-
biguity irrelevant because of hedging (as discussed in Section 2.1), Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) propose a relaxation of their independence assumption, which is State-wise Indepen-
dence in our setting, to capture this. They allow the individual’s preference to be convex so
that she may strictly prefer state-wise randomization; meanwhile, constant acts should con-
tinue to satisfy the independence assumption, because constant acts do not provide hedging
opportunities. We relax State-wise Independence in the same way.
We also want to relax Independence so that the individual may strictly prefer randomiza-
tion. In the urn experiment, if the individual agrees with Raiffa’s (1961) argument—or, in the
service example, if the details of the services are precisely stated in contracts beforehand—
randomization can render ambiguity irrelevant. In the investment example in Figure 5,
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randomization partially eliminates the effect of ambiguity, which also violates Independence.
We relax Independence following the way Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) relax State-wise
Independence.
We say that a lottery P preserves Independence if for any lotteries Q,R and α ∈ (0, 1),
Q % R if and only if αQ+ (1−α)P % αR+ (1−α)P . We say that an act f preserves State-
wise Independence if for any acts g, h and α ∈ (0, 1), g % h if and only if αg +sw (1− α)f %
αh+sw (1− α)f .
Axiom 6 (Preference for Randomization)
(i) For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ [0, 1], P % Q implies αP + (1− α)Q % Q;
(ii) Every constant act preserves Independence.
Axiom 7 (Preference for State-wise Randomization)
(i) For any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1], f % g implies αf +sw (1− α)g % g;
(ii) Every constant act preserves State-wise Independence.
Next, we replace Strong Dominance with three weaker axioms. Strong Dominance re-
quires that the individual be indifferent between randomization and state-wise randomiza-
tion, but as discussed earlier, the individual may not agree that randomization is as useful
in eliminating the effect of ambiguity as state-wise randomization. For instance, suppose an
individual believes that the effect of ambiguity is unaffected by randomization in the urn
experiment. Since the 50-50 state-wise randomization renders ambiguity irrelevant in the
urn experiment (as discussed in Section 2.1), this individual must have viewed randomization
and state-wise randomization differently. Hence, Strong Dominance is violated.13
13An individual can simultaneously violate Independence, State-wise Independence, and Strong Dominance.
To see this, consider an individual who believes that randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity in the
service example with precise contracts (which suggests that Independence is violated), and at the same time
believes that ambiguity is unaffected by randomization in the urn experiment. Since the 50-50 state-wise
randomization renders ambiguity irrelevant in the urn experiment, both State-wise Independence and Strong
Dominance are violated.
16
Indifference between the two types of mixture operations arises because to compare two
lotteries, P and Q, Strong Dominance first converts them to two acts, state by state, via re-
duction of compound lotteries (see (1)). The conversion turns randomization into state-wise
randomization and implicitly identifies the two types of mixture operations. Therefore, a nat-
ural weakening is to compare P and Q without the conversion. We compare them realization
by realization and state by state. The relation between realization-by-realization comparison
of lotteries and first-order stochastic dominance is well known. Following Lehmann (1955),
we say that a set of acts F ⊂ F is increasing if, whenever fi % gi for any i and g ∈ F , we
have f ∈ F .
Definition 2 We say that P first-order stochastically dominates Q if for any increasing set
of acts F ⊂ F , P (F ) ≥ Q(F ).
For any two acts f and g, we think of f as an improvement of g if fi % gi for ev-
ery i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The condition in the above definition implies that we can view P as
a realization-by-realization improvement of Q, similar to the classic results on first-order
stochastic dominance from the theory of risk. The axiom below, FOSD, says that if P is a
realization-by-realization improvement of Q, P is preferred to Q.14
Axiom 8 (FOSD) For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), if P first-order stochastically dominates Q, then
P % Q.
The next two axioms compare randomization with state-wise randomization. The first
is related to a natural definition of second-order stochastic dominance in our setting. The
discussion in Sections 1 and 2.1 shows that the extent to which randomization eliminates the
effect of ambiguity depends on the individual’s subjective timing belief, while the extent to
which state-wise randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity does not. Moreover, under
14One can show that FOSD is weaker than the relaxation of Strong Dominance in Saito (2011). In the
context of social choice, the idea behind the monotonicity conditions in Gajdos and Maurin (2004) and
Fleurbaey (2010) is similar to FOSD.
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the same mixture probability, state-wise randomization should be weakly more effective
in eliminating the effect of ambiguity than randomization, regardless of the individual’s
subjective timing belief. Therefore, given any lottery, the individual should prefer to replace
randomization with state-wise randomization whenever possible.
What choice behavior reveals that the individual prefers to replace randomization with
state-wise randomization? First, we should have αf +sw (1 − α)g % αf + (1 − α)g for any
acts f, g and α ∈ [0, 1].
The comparison between αf +sw (1− α)g and αf + (1− α)g closely resembles the com-
parison between δ$(αx+(1−α)y) and αδ$x + (1− α)δ$y (x, y ∈ R) in expected utility theory. In
particular, αf +sw (1 − α)g and αf + (1 − α)g share the same expected utility (of prizes)
fixing any state, similar to how δ$(αx+(1−α)y) and αδ$x + (1− α)δ$y share the same expected
amount of money. In expected utility theory, αδ$x + (1− α)δ$y is a mean-preserving spread
of δ$(αx+(1−α)y) (see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)). We define mean-preserving spreads in
our setting following how they are defined in Rothschild and Stiglitz.
Definition 3 We say that Q is a mean-preserving spread of P if P = β[αf +sw (1− α)g] +
(1−β)R and Q = β[αf +(1−α)g]+(1−β)R for some acts f, g, lottery R, and α, β ∈ [0, 1].
When Q is a mean-preserving spread of P as defined above, some randomization in Q
involving the acts f and g is replaced with state-wise randomization in P . According to our
previous discussion, the individual should prefer P to Q, as stated in the axiom below.
Axiom 9 (SOSD) For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), if Q is a mean-preserving spread of Q, then
P % Q.
The last axiom states that for constant acts, the individual remains indifferent between
randomization and state-wise randomization, as in subjective expected utility theory.15 To
understand this, recall that under SOSD, P % Q if Q = β[αf + (1 − α)g] + (1 − β)R and
15A similar idea appears in an axiom called Indifference to Probability Mixture in Saito (2013).
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P = β[αf +sw (1 − α)g] + (1 − β)R. Strict preference P  Q occurs, however, only if
αf +sw (1 − α)g in P is strictly more effective in eliminating the effect of ambiguity than
αf + (1−α)g in Q. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), we have assumed that when g
is a constant act, neither αf+sw (1−α)g nor αf+(1−α)g eliminates the effect of ambiguity
(see part (ii) of Preference for Randomization and part (ii) of Preference for State-wise
Randomization). Thus, if g is a constant act, αf +sw (1 − α)g will not be strictly more
effective than αf + (1 − α)g in eliminating the effect of ambiguity, and P  Q should not
occur. This observation is stated in our last axiom below.
We say that P can be obtained by modifying Q’s mixture timing of constant acts or Q
can be obtained by modifying P ’s mixture timing of constant acts if
P = β[αf +sw (1− α)p] + (1− β)R and Q = β[αf + (1− α)p] + (1− β)R
for some act f , constant act p, lottery R, and α, β ∈ [0, 1].
Axiom 10 (Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts) For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), if P
can be obtained by modifying Q’s mixture timing of constant acts, then P ∼ Q.
This axiom rules out the possibility that, for example, the individual prefers early risk
resolution or has different risk attitudes before and after the state is revealed. We can
incorporate these possibilities in our analysis, but we leave them out to emphasize that our
findings are not driven by these possibilities.
The following lemma complements Lemma 1 and shows that under some of our new
axioms, Independence and State-wise Independence imply Strong Dominance. Together with
Lemma 1, this means that it is impossible to only violate one axiom among Independence,
State-wise Independence, and Strong Dominance. Any two of those three axioms imply the
third. This finding will be useful later.
Lemma 2 Suppose % satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, FOSD, and Indifference to Mixture
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Timing of Constant Acts. Independence and State-wise Independence imply Strong Domi-
nance.
Our main theorem will show that the axioms above are equivalent to the following rep-
resentation of the individual’s preference. Let K(∆(S)) be the collection of all nonempty
closed subsets of ∆(S) endowed with the Hausdorff metric topology. Since ∆(S) is compact
and Polish, K(∆(S)) is also compact and Polish (see Theorem 3.85 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)).
Definition 4 The individual’s preference % has a double maxmin expected utility (DMEU)
representation if there exist a continuous expected utility function u : ∆(X ) → R and a
compact collection M of compact subsets of ∆(S) such that % can be represented by












If the individual’s preference % has a representation described in the above definition,
we say that % has a DMEU representation (M, u). Below is the main theorem.
Theorem 2 The individual’s preference % has a DMEU representation if and only if it
satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Preference for Randomization, Preference for State-wise
Randomization, FOSD, SOSD, and Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts.
The uniqueness of the representation will be studied in Section 3.2, and we provide some
comparative static results in the Appendix.
In the DMEU representation, each M ∈ M is a set of priors called a scenario. The
interpretation of the representation is that the individual who is conservative and focuses
on the worst case believes that before she randomizes (trivially or not), a scenario M ∈ M
unknown to her has occurred, and after the realization of her randomization, an unknown
probability law from M will be determined. Alternatively, the individual believes that before
she randomizes, nature, which plays against her, has chosen a scenario fromM, and after she
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randomizes, nature will choose a probability law from the scenario based on the realization
of her randomization.
Randomization may only partially eliminate the effect of ambiguity. It may help the
individual hedge across scenarios, but not across probability laws within a scenario. Figure
5 is a simple example. If the individual chooses “Long” deterministically, the worst scenario
will be MB. If she chooses “Short” deterministically, the worst scenario will be MG. Either
way, her utility will be zero. However, if she randomizes between “Long” and “Short” with
equal probability, the effect of ambiguity induced by MG and MB is eliminated: In scenarios
MG and MB, the individual receives the same prize with utility 0.5. The worst scenario now
is MN , which contains two priors. Randomization cannot eliminate the effect of ambiguity
induced by the priors in MN , and the individual’s utility will be 0.3 under MN .
For any two acts f and g, randomization between f and g may be strictly preferred only
if f and g have different minimizing scenarios. With trivial randomization—that is, if the
individual chooses an act f with probability 1—(3) becomes





in which M =
⋃
M∈MM pools all priors together.
3.1 Sketch of the Proof
To prove the sufficiency of the axioms, we begin by finding an expected utility represen-
tation for the individual’s preference over constant acts, and use it to construct a utility
representation W (P ) for her preference over lotteries.
Next, we define the expected utility core %∗ of %: For any lotteries P,Q, P %∗ Q if for
any R ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ (0, 1], αP + (1− α)R % αQ+ (1− α)R. Our notion of the expected
utility core is similar to that of Cerreia-Vioglio (2009), Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015), and
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Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2017).16
We verify that %∗ satisfies the axioms in Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) and then
apply their main theorem to find a closed (and convex) set of continuous functions V such
that P %∗ Q if and only if
∫
F
V (u(f1), . . . , u(fn)) dP ≥
∫
F
V (u(f1), . . . , u(fn)) dQ
for every V ∈ V.
We show that if P first-order stochastically dominates Q or Q is a mean-preserving
spread of P , P %∗ Q. In addition, if P can be obtained by modifying Q’s mixture timing
of constant acts, P ∼∗ Q. According to the definition of %∗, these observations imply that
every V ∈ V satisfies properties similar to those in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Lemma
3.3, and therefore every V ∈ V has an MEU representation. Then, we use the fact that every
V has an MEU representation to establish that V is bounded and equicontinuous. According
to the Arzelá–Ascoli theorem, V is compact.
Finally, we show that




V (u(f1), . . . , u(fn)) dP ; (4)
that is, the representation of the individual’s preference W (P ) we initially constructed is
equal to the minimum of
∫
F V (u(f1), . . . , u(fn)) dP .
17 Note that for any lotteries P and Q,
P %∗ Q⇒ P % Q, but the converse is not true in general. However, our axioms ensure that
the converse holds under certain conditions, which is a key property of %∗ for proving (4):
16Similar concepts have also appeared in earlier papers, including Nehring (2001) and Ghirardato, Mac-
cheroni, and Marinacci (2004), which can be viewed as the dual version of the type of expected utility core
that we use.
17The right-hand side of (4) is similar to the representation in Maccheroni (2002), but our choice domain,
proof strategy, and research questions differ from his.
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For any lottery P and constant act p,
P % p⇒ P %∗ p.
A similar property of the expected utility core is also used in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015).
3.2 Uniqueness of the DMEU Representation
Suppose the individual’s preference is represented by the DMEU representation W as in (3).
In general, we can add redundant scenarios to M without changing W , and hence M will
not be unique. For example, suppose M = {{µ1, µ2}} for some distinct µ1, µ2 ∈ ∆(S). If





















the function W will be unaffected. Once we remove the redundant scenarios from M,
however, M will essentially be unique.
Our proof of Theorem 2 in fact shows that the preference % satisfies the axioms if and
only if it has a DMEU representation (M, u) such thatM is a compact and convex collection
of compact and convex subsets of ∆(S).18 When a DMEU representation of % satisfies these
additional convexity assumptions, we say that % has a DMEU∗ representation.
The result below shows that there is a unique DMEU∗ representation whose set of sce-
narios is minimal. The uniqueness of the expected utility function u is standard: It is unique
up to a positive affine transformation.
Theorem 3 Suppose the individual’s preference % satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Pref-
erence for Randomization, Preference for State-wise Randomization, FOSD, SOSD, and
18In the definition of the DMEU representation, we do not impose these additional convexity assumptions.
This will keep our examples and discussion simple. For instance, the simple examples in Figures 3–5 do not
satisfy these convexity assumptions.
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Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts. Then, % has a DMEU∗ representation(
M̂, u
)
such that the following statements hold:
1. For any DMEU∗ representation (M, v) of %, M̂ ⊂M and v = αu+β for some α > 0
and β ∈ R.
2. The expected utility core %∗ of % satisfies the following: For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), P %∗ Q





















for every M ∈ M̂.
Moreover, M̂ is unique.
Our notion of uniqueness is similar to that of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015). In their
continuous cautious expected utility representation, the minimal set of certainty equivalent
functions is unique up to the closed convex hull.
4 Special Cases of the DMEU
We examine three special cases of the DMEU. In the first, it is as if the individual always
believes that nature moves before she randomizes; in the second, it is as if she always believes
that nature moves after she randomizes; and the third is Saito (2015). Epstein et al. (2007),
Seo (2009), and Saito (2015) have studied representations similar to the first two special
cases mentioned above.
To obtain the DMEU representation, we simultaneously relax Independence, State-wise
Independence, and Strong Dominance. A natural question is what the representation of the
individual’s preference looks like if we only relax some of them. Lemmas 1 and 2 tell us that
imposing any two of these three axioms is equivalent to imposing all of them, which leads
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to the SEU representation. Therefore, the remaining possibility is to impose exactly one of
the three axioms on a preference with a DMEU representation.
First, we show that if Strong Dominance is imposed, it is as if the individual always
believes that nature moves before she randomizes, which corresponds to Raiffa (1961).
Theorem 4 Suppose the individual’s preference % has a DMEU representation. Then, there
exists a continuous expected utility function u : ∆(X ) → R and a compact set M ⊂ ∆(S)
such that









represents % if and only if % satisfies Strong Dominance.
We call (5) the Ex Ante MEU representation. This representation is equivalent to the
DMEU representation whose scenarios are all singletons, and the union of whose scenarios
is M. In the Ex Ante MEU representation, for each prior µ ∈M, the individual evaluates a
lottery P using the standard SEU formula. Therefore, it is as if the individual believes that
before she randomizes, a fixed but unknown probability law has already been determined.
To understand why the Ex Ante MEU representation satisfies Strong Dominance, recall
that an important consequence of Strong Dominance is P ∼ fP , which is generally not true
in the DMEU representation. However, in the Ex Ante MEU representation, P ∼ fP always
holds:






















u(fP ) dµ = W ea(fP ).
Next, we turn to Independence. If Independence is imposed instead, we will obtain a
representation in which it is as if the individual always believes that nature moves after she
randomizes.
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Theorem 5 Suppose the individual’s preference % has a DMEU representation. Then, there
exists a continuous expected utility function u : ∆(X ) → R and a compact set M ⊂ ∆(S)
such that











represents % if and only if % satisfies Independence.
We call (6) the Ex Post MEU representation. This representation is equivalent to the
DMEU representation that has only one scenario, M. In the Ex Post MEU representation,
to evaluate a lottery P , for each act that is a realization of the lottery, the individual takes
the worst prior from M to evaluate the act. Therefore, it is as if the individual believes that
nature moves only after the realization of her randomization.
The reason the Ex Post MEU representation satisfies Independence is simple: W ep(P ) is
linear in P .
Finally, if we impose State-wise Independence on a preference with a DMEU representa-
tion, we will return to the SEU representation. To see this, recall that in a DMEU represen-
tation, the utility of an act (degenerate lottery) f is W (f) = minµ∈M
∫
S u(f) dµ, in which
M =
⋃
M∈MM pools together all priors from all scenarios. This is the MEU representa-
tion of preferences over acts from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). If State-wise Independence
holds, W (f) must be linear. Then, there can only be one prior in M, which means that the
DMEU representation must be an SEU representation.
4.1 Saito (2015) and the DMEU Representation
Saito (2015) observes that in the urn experiment, there are two intuitive ways to evalu-
ate a lottery. Using our language, the two ways correspond to the two extreme views of
randomization—the view that nature moves completely before the individual randomizes
and the view that nature moves completely after. Saito characterizes a representation in
which a lottery P is evaluated by a convex combination of the Ex Ante MEU function and
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the Ex Post MEU function; that is, the utility of P is equal to
W (P ) = δW ea(P ) + (1− δ)W ep(P ) (7)
for some δ ∈ [0, 1] and some Ex Ante MEU function W ea and Ex Post MEU function W ep
that share the same set of priors M. The parameter δ measures how useful randomization
is in the elimination of ambiguity’s effect. Clearly, the main idea of this representation is
closely related to that of our DMEU representation, and we show below that in fact, Saito’s
(2015) representation is a special case of the DMEU representation.
Saito’s (2015) representation generalizes the Ex Ante MEU and the Ex Post MEU repre-
sentations, but is not flexible enough to capture the following version of the service example.
Suppose there are four service providers. Two are in town A, and the other two in town
B. In town A, the convention is that service providers provide precise contracts, although
no one reads them. In town B, the convention is that no contracts will be provided. The
quality of the services in town B, however, is “as good as” that of town A and the individual
knows that. Specifically, there are four states. In state sij, town A’s ith provider’s service
and town B’s jth provider’s service are identical with payoffs being 1 for the individual, and
the payoffs of the other services are 0, i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. Consider two choice problems.
In the first, the individual will only consider town A’s services due, for example, to weather
conditions. In the second, she will only consider town B’s. According to our discussion, in
the first problem, randomization eliminates the effect of ambiguity. In the second, the effect
of ambiguity is unaffected by randomization. In (7), this individual must use δ = 1 in the
first problem and δ = 0 in the second. This is not allowed, since δ is fixed in Saito. The
DMEU representation, however, allows the individual to hold a subjective timing belief that
is consistent with this example.
In terms of Saito’s (2015) axioms, because he studies preferences over sets of acts, it
is not straightforward to see which of his axioms is violated by this example. Intuitively,
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however, the violated axiom should be Dominance. Denote the 50-50 randomization between
choosing the two service providers in town A by P , and the 50-50 randomization between
choosing the two service providers in town B by Q. Now, imagine that nature moves before
the individual randomizes in both choice problems. In that case, P and Q will be equally
good. Similarly, imagine that nature moves after she randomizes in both choice problems. In
that case, P and Q will again be equally good. Since Saito’s Dominance compares lotteries
based only on these two hypothetical extreme timing beliefs, Dominance should imply that
the individual is indifferent between P and Q. According to our discussion, however, the
individual may strictly prefer P to Q.
It is not obvious why the objective function (7) is a special case of the DMEU repre-
sentation. To see this directly from the representation, given a representation as in (7), for
each µ̂ ∈ M, let Mµ̂ := {δµ̂ + (1 − δ)µ′ : µ′ ∈ M}. Let M := {Mµ̂ : µ̂ ∈ M}. Since M
is compact, verifying that M is compact is straightforward. Now, consider the following
DMEU representation:










































= δW ea(P ) + (1− δ)W ep(P ).
Thus, the individual’s objective function in Saito (2015) is a special case of the DMEU
representation.
The observation above proves the following result.
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Theorem 6 Suppose the individual’s preference % can be represented by



















for some compact and convex set M ⊂ ∆(S) and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, % has a DMEU represen-
tation (M, u), in which M = {Mµ̂ : µ̂ ∈ M} and Mµ̂ = {δµ̂ + (1 − δ)µ′ : µ′ ∈ M} for each
µ̂ ∈M.
This finding allows us to use the DMEU representation to offer a new interpretation of
Saito’s (2015) representation. Consider an individual who believes that the set of possible
priors is a convex set M. She believes that before she randomizes, nature has partially
determined the probability law by choosing a subset of M or, equivalently, shrinking M to
some subset of it. In particular, she believes that nature can shrink M by a fixed fraction,
1 − δ, centered at any µ̂ ∈ M. Note that shrinking M by 1 − δ centered at µ̂ ∈ M exactly
generates the scenario Mµ̂ we construct above. Therefore, if an individual’s preference can
be represented by (7), it is as if she holds the above belief about how the probability law is
determined.
5 Discussion
We have discussed several related papers at the end of the Introduction. We provide addi-
tional discussion in this section. In addition to Saito (2015), Seo (2009) and Saito (2011)
are closely related to our paper. Seo characterizes the second-order subjective expected utility
(SOSEU) representation, in which the individual has a probability measure m ∈ ∆(∆(S))
over probability measures on the state space (µ’s from ∆(S)), and she evaluates a lottery P
according to













19This representation is similar to the smooth ambiguity representation introduced by Klibanoff, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2005).
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In terms of axioms, there are two main differences between the SOSEU representation and
the DMEU representation. First, the former maintains Independence, while the latter relaxes
it. Thus, in Seo, the individual always disagrees with Raiffa’s argument that randomization
renders ambiguity irrelevant and has no preference for randomization. Second, the DMEU
representation satisfies Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts, while the SOSEU
representation reduces to the SEU representation if a similar additional axiom is imposed (see
Seo’s Corollary 5.2). Hence, the only intersection between Seo’s representation and ours is
the SEU representation. Finally, as the function v in Seo’s representation becomes arbitrarily
concave, the SOSEU representation will converge to the Ex Post MEU representation.
Noting that there are two popular ways to evaluate randomization under ambiguity,
which correspond to what we call the Ex Ante MEU and the Ex Post MEU representations,
Saito (2011) introduces a representation that combines them (see (7)). This representation
later appears in Saito (2015), who, by analyzing preferences over sets of acts, characterizes
the behavior of an individual who anticipates choosing randomly from a set of acts. Section
4.1 discusses some main differences between Saito’s model and ours. In particular, since
the DMEU representation nests Saito’s representation as a special case, the latter must
also satisfy SOSD. In other words, fixing any mixture probability, state-wise randomization
must be more effective than randomization in eliminating the effect of ambiguity in Saito’s
representation.
The choice domain we use is from AA. By analyzing the individual’s preference in the
choice domain ∆(F), AA characterize the SEU representation. If their axiom, Reversal of
Order in Compound Lotteries—or, in our version, Strong Dominance—holds, the individual
does not distinguish between randomization and state-wise randomization. Then, the choice
domain ∆(F) can be reduced to F , in which case only state-wise randomization needs to
be considered. Many papers on ambiguity have been built on this reduced version of AA’s
domain, either for the reason above or because randomization is not considered from the
beginning; these include Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Schmeidler (1989); Ghirardato and
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Marinacci (2001); Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006); Siniscalchi (2009); Cerreia-
Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011); Lehrer and Teper (2011); and Frick
et al. (2019). In contrast, Seo (2009), Saito (2011), and our paper adopt the original choice
domain of AA without imposing Strong Dominance.
A large body of research has studied ambiguity and robustness (some maxmin principles)
in various areas of economics. However, how mixed strategies should be introduced and eval-
uated has been an issue. For example, most papers that study monopoly sales problems have
assumed that randomization can help individuals hedge (similar to the case in the Ex Ante
MEU representation).20 On the other hand, most papers on contracts/auctions/mechanisms
with ambiguity or robustness concerns have either ruled out randomization/mixed strategies
or assumed that randomization does not help individuals hedge (similar to the case in the
Ex Post MEU representation).21 Some of these papers point out that randomization should
help individuals hedge, but this case will be more difficult to deal with.22 An exception is
Bose and Renou (2014), who examine both extreme cases. Mixed strategies are ruled out in
most papers on robustness or ambiguity in macroeconomics and finance. At least in some
of these papers, it is natural to consider mixed strategies.23
6 Conclusion
How randomization/mixed strategies should be modeled in the presence of ambiguity or
when some maxmin principle is used has been an unsettled issue in many research areas
of economics. Two simple yet opposite ways to model randomization are well known. In
the classic urn experiment of Ellsberg (1961), one corresponds to Raiffa (1961)—by which
20See, among others, Linhart and Radner (1989); Bergemann and Schlag (2008, 2011); Auster (2018); and
Carrasco et al. (2018).
21See, among others, Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2006); Bose and Daripa (2009); Bodoh-Creed (2012);
Carroll (2015, 2017); Wolitzky (2016); de Castro, Liu, and Yannelis (2017a,b); Di Tillio et al. (2017);
de Castro and Yannelis (2018); and Carroll and Segal (2019).
22According to our analysis, some of these papers (e.g., Di Tillio et al. (2017)) should have assumed that
randomization helps individuals hedge due to their timing assumptions, but they do not.
23See, among others, Easley and O’Hara (2010); Epstein and Schneider (2010); Antić (2014); Easley et al.
(2014); and Ilut, Kehrig, and Schneider (2018).
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randomization should render ambiguity irrelevant—and the other argues that the effect of
ambiguity is unaffected by randomization.
We point out that the individual’s belief about how the unknown probability law is
determined is important in answering this question. If the individual believes that before she
randomizes, the probability law—although unknown to her—has been determined, then the
first way to model randomization is reasonable. If, however, she believes that the probability
law is determined only after her randomization, then the second way is reasonable.
The subjective belief about how the unknown probability law is determined, however,
is usually more complicated than these two extreme cases. For example, the probability
that an investment is successful may depend on some long-term factor and some short-term
factor. The individual may believe that before she makes any decision (possibly randomized),
the unknown long-term factor has been determined, while the short-term factor will be
determined much later. In this case, neither of these two ways to model randomization
seems appropriate.
To address these issues, we adopt the classic framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
and relax their axioms. A new representation is derived. In the representation, the individual
has a collection of sets of priors, M. She behaves as if she believes that before she random-
izes (trivially or not), nature has chosen an unknown scenario (a set of priors) M ∈ M,
and after the randomization, nature will choose an unknown prior from M . Thus, the indi-
vidual’s preference reveals her belief about how the unknown probability law is determined,
and the representation allows randomization to partially eliminate the effect of ambiguity:
Randomization may help the individual hedge across scenarios, but not across probability
laws within a scenario.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The first statement can be verified using equation (1) and Weak
Order directly. Next, suppose Independence and Strong Dominance hold. Take any acts
f, g, h and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f % g. By Independence, we know that αf + (1 − α)h %
αg+ (1−α)h. Using the first statement of the lemma, αf + (1−α)h ∼ αf +sw (1−α)h and
αg + (1− α)h ∼ αg +sw (1− α)h. Therefore, αf +sw (1− α)h % αg +sw (1− α)h. Showing
that αf +sw (1− α)h % αg +sw (1− α)h implies f % g is similar. Next, suppose State-wise
Independence and Strong Dominance hold. Take any lotteries P,Q,R and α ∈ (0, 1) such
that P % Q. Due to the first statement of the lemma, fP % fQ. By State-wise Independence,
αfP +sw (1− α)fR % αfQ +sw (1− α)fR. Applying the first statement of the lemma again,
we know that αfP +sw (1−α)fR ∼ αP + (1−α)R and αfQ +sw (1−α)fR ∼ αQ+ (1−α)R.
Therefore, αP + (1−α)R % αQ+ (1−α)R. Showing that αP + (1−α)R % αQ+ (1−α)R
implies P % Q is similar.

Proof of Lemma 2: Consider two lotteries P and Q such that fPi % f
Q
i for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By FOSD, fP % fQ. For each f ∈ F , by Weak Order and Continuity, we
can find a constant act pf such that f ∼ pf (see Lemma 4 for more details). Let {Pl}∞l=1 be
a sequence of finite-support lotteries that converges to P . Take an arbitrary Pl. By applying
Independence finitely many times, we know that the lottery P̄l :=
∑
f∈supp(Pl)
Pl(f) · pf ∈
∆(∆(X )) is indifferent to Pl =
∑
f∈supp(Pl)














Pl(f) · pf by modifying P̄l’s mixture timing of constant acts finitely
many times. Thus, Weak Order and Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts imply
that Pl ∼ P̄l ∼ fPl . Since fPl converges to fP according to (1), by Continuity , P ∼ fP . The
same arguments apply to Q. Therefore, P % Q.
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
Proof of Theorem 2: We first prove the sufficiency of the axioms. Preference for
State-wise Randomization implies that for any α ∈ (0, 1) and p, q, r ∈ ∆(X ), p  q implies
αp +sw (1 − α)r  αq +sw (1 − α)r. Since X is Polish, ∆(X ) is Polish, and hence F is
closed in ∆(F) and the set of constant acts is closed in ∆(F) (see Chapter 15 of Aliprantis
and Border (2006)). Therefore, by Continuity, for any p ∈ ∆(X ), {q ∈ ∆(X ) : q % p} and
{q ∈ ∆(X ) : p % q} are closed. According to expected utility theory, there exists a continuous
expected utility function u : ∆(X )→ R such that p % q if and only if u(p) ≥ u(q), in which
the mixture operation is “+sw.”
Similarly, when restricting % to ∆(∆(X )), % also satisfies Independence.
Lemma 3 Every lottery in ∆(∆(X )) preserves Independence.
Proof. We show that for any p, q ∈ ∆(X ) and α ∈ (0, 1), αp + (1 − α)q also preserves
Independence. Take any P,Q ∈ ∆(F). Because p preserves Independence, for any β ∈ (0, 1),
P % Q if and only if βP + (1− β)p % βQ+ (1− β)p. Because q preserves Independence, for
any γ ∈ (0, 1), βP + (1− β)p % βQ+ (1− β)p if and only if
γ(βP + (1− β)p) + (1− γ)q % γ(βQ+ (1− β)p) + (1− γ)q. (8)
In particular, let γ = α





Clearly, γ ∈ (α, 1) and
βγ =
αβ
1− β + αβ
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can take any value in (0, 1) since α and β are arbitrary numbers in (0, 1). Then, (8) becomes
βγP + (1− βγ)(αp+ (1− α)q) % βγQ+ (1− βγ)(αp+ (1− α)q)
for any βγ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, αp+ (1− α)q preserves Independence.
A standard induction argument implies that all lotteries in ∆(∆(X )) (randomization
over constant acts ∆(X )) with finite support perserve Independence. Since X is Polish,
∆(X ) is Polish, and therefore lotteries with finite support are dense in ∆(∆(X )) (Theorem
15.10 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). By Continuity, all lotteries in ∆(∆(X )) perserve
Independence.
Since ∆(∆(X )) is a closed subset of ∆(F) (Corollary 15.6 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)), % on ∆(∆(X )) satisfies the standard continuity axiom. Thus, there exists a con-
tinuous expected utility function uea : ∆(∆(X )) → R such that for any P,Q ∈ ∆(∆(X )),
P % Q if and only if uea(P ) ≥ uea(Q), in which the mixture operation is “+.”
Because X is compact, u and uea are both continuous expected utility functions, and
they represent the same preference on ∆(X ), we must be able to find a best xh and a
worst xl such that u(δxh) = u
ea(δxh) = 1 and u(δxl) = u
ea(δxl) = 0, and u(∆(X )) =
uea(∆(X )) = [0, 1].24 For any p ∈ ∆(X ), we can find a unique αp ∈ [0, 1] such that
p ∼ αpδxh + (1− αp)δxl (see Lemma 4 for more details). By Indifference to Mixture Timing
of Constant Acts, αpδxh + (1− αp)δxl ∼ αpδxh +sw (1− αp)δxl . Then, we have u(p) = uea(p)
any p ∈ ∆(X ), which in turn implies that for any P ∈ ∆(∆(X )), u(fP ) = uea(P ). Therefore,
from here on, with an abuse of notation, we use u to denote uea; that is, u is a continuous
expected utility representation of % restricted to ∆(∆(X )) under the mixture operation “+,”
and also of % restricted to ∆(X ) under the mixture operation “+sw.” For each act f , let
u(f) denote the n-tuple (u(f1), . . . , u(fn)) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Each lottery P ∈ ∆(F) induces a Borel probability measure mP on [0, 1]n. Take any
Borel set Λ ⊂ [0, 1]n. Recall that F is a closed subset of ∆(F). Since u is continuous,
24Note that u is linear on ∆(X ), and uea is linear on ∆(∆(X )).
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{f ∈ F : u(f) ∈ Λ} is also Borel in ∆(F). Then, we define mP (Λ) := P ({f ∈ F : u(f) ∈ Λ})
for each Borel set Λ ⊂ [0, 1]n. Verifying that mP is a probability measure is standard. This
definition implies that for any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), α ∈ (0, 1), and Borel set Λ ⊂ [0, 1]n,
mαP+(1−α)Q(Λ) = [αP + (1− α)Q]({f ∈ F : u(f) ∈ Λ}) (9)
= αP ({f ∈ F : u(f) ∈ Λ}) + (1− α)Q({f ∈ F : u(f) ∈ Λ})
= αmP (Λ) + (1− α)mQ(Λ);
that is, mαP+(1−α)Q and αmP + (1− α)mQ are the same measure.
Clearly, {mP : P ∈ ∆(F)} is a subset of ∆([0, 1]n), the set of all Borel probability
measures on [0, 1]n. The converse also holds. For each (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n, we can find
an act f (α1,...,αn) such that f
(α1,...,αn)
i = αiδxh + (1 − αi)δxl .25 By definition, u(f (α1,...,αn)) =
(α1, . . . , αn). Note that F
hl := {f (α1,...,αn) : (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n} is closed in F and thus
in ∆(F). Take an arbitrary m ∈ ∆([0, 1]n). For any Borel measurable set F ⊂ F , define
ΛF := {(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n : (α1, . . . , αn) = u(f) for some f ∈ F ∩ F hl}. Since F ∩ F hl is
Borel and u is continuous, ΛF is Borel measurable. Let Pm(F ) = m(ΛF ). It is standard to
verify that Pm ∈ ∆(F). Therefore, {mP : P ∈ ∆(F)} = ∆([0, 1]n).
For simplicity, for any x ∈ X , we write x instead of δx. Then, x may be treated as a
consequence, a degenerate prize, a constant act, or a degenerate lottery, depending on the
context. Next, we use u to construct a representation of %.
Lemma 4 There exists a continuous function I : ∆([0, 1]n)→ R+ such that for any P,Q ∈
∆(F), (a) P % Q if and only if I(mP ) ≥ I(mQ); (b) I(mP ) = u(P ) if P ∈ ∆(∆(X )); and
(c) I(∆([0, 1]n)) = [0, 1].
Proof. Take any P ∈ ∆(F). By Continuity, {α ∈ [0, 1] : αxh + (1 − α)xl % P} and
{α ∈ [0, 1] : P % αxh + (1 − α)xl} are closed in [0, 1]. Neither is empty, because FOSD
implies that xh % P % xl and hence 1 belongs to the former set and 0 belongs to the latter.
25The mixture used here is the standard mixture operation from expected utility theory.
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Because the union of those two sets is a connected set [0, 1], we know that the two sets
cannot have empty intersection. Therefore, for any P , we can find some αP such that
αPxh + (1− αP )xl ∼ P.
Since % is nontrivial, xh  xl and for any α > α′, αxh + (1 − α)xl  α′xh + (1 − α′)xl.
Therefore, αP is unique for each P ∈ ∆(F). Define a function Ĩ : ∆(F)→ [0, 1] such that
Ĩ(P ) = αP .
For constant acts xh and xl, Ĩ(xh) = 1 = u(xh) and Ĩ(xl) = 0 = u(xl). It is standard to
verify that Ĩ represents %.
Note that if P ∈ ∆(∆(X )), P ∼ αPxh + (1− αP )xl implies that u(P ) = u(αPxh + (1−
αP )xl). Therefore, Ĩ(P ) = u(P ) for any P ∈ ∆(∆(X )).
For each m ∈ ∆([0, 1]n), we can find some P ∈ ∆(F) such that m = mP . Define
I(m) = Ĩ(P ) for each m ∈ ∆([0, 1]n). Then, we obtain a function I : ∆([0, 1]n) → [0, 1].
Note that I is well defined: For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F) such that mP = mQ, we must have P ∼ Q
and hence Ĩ(P ) = Ĩ(Q). This is because when mP = mQ, according to our definition, P first-
order stochastically dominates Q and Q first-order stochastically dominates P . Therefore,
by FOSD, P ∼ Q.
By Continuity, I is continuous. To see this, take any sequence of Borel probability
measures on [0, 1]n, {ml}∞l=1, that converges to m ∈ ∆([0, 1]n). The sequence of lotteries
{Pml}∞l=1 must converge to Pm. Based on how we define Ĩ, Ĩ(Pml) must converge to Ĩ(Pm).
Last, since I(∆([0, 1]n)) is connected, I(∆([0, 1]n)) = [0, 1].
The function I satisfies two additional useful properties.
Lemma 5 For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ [0, 1], I(αmP + (1 − α)mQ) ≥ αI(mP ) + (1 −
α)I(mQ).
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Proof. We know from Lemma 4 that αPxh+(1−αP )xl ∼ P and αQxh+(1−αQ)xl ∼ Q. By
Lemma 3, we know that both αPxh+(1−αP )xl and αQxh+(1−αQ)xl preserve Independence.
Therefore,
αP + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl]
∼ α[αPxh + (1− αP )xl] + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl]
∼ α[αPxh + (1− αP )xl] + (1− α)Q.
By part (i) of Preference for Randomization,
1
2
(αP + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl]) +
1
2
(α[αPxh + (1− αP )xl] + (1− α)Q)
% α[αPxh + (1− αP )xl] + (1− α)Q




(αP + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl]) +
1
2




(αP + (1− α)Q) + 1
2
(α[αPxh + (1− αP )xl] + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl])
% α[αPxh + (1− αP )xl] + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl],
which implies that αP + (1 − α)Q % α[αPxh + (1 − αP )xl] + (1 − α)[αQxh + (1 − αQ)xl]
since α[αPxh + (1−αP )xl] + (1−α)[αQxh + (1−αQ)xl] preserves Independence. Therefore,
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according to parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 4,
I(αmP + (1− α)mQ) = I(mαP+(1−α)Q)











= αI(mP ) + (1− α)I(mQ).
Lemma 6 For any P ∈ ∆(∆(X )), Q ∈ ∆(F), and α ∈ [0, 1], I(αmP + (1 − α)mQ) =
αu(P ) + (1− α)I(mQ).
Proof. According to Lemma 4, Q ∼ αQxh + (1 − αQ)xl. Since P preserves Independence
(Lemma 3), αP + (1− α)Q ∼ αP + (1− α)[αQxh + (1− αQ)xl]. Then,





αmP + (1− α)mαQxh+(1−αQ)xl
)
= αu(P ) + (1− α)I(mαQxh+(1−αQ)xl)
= αu(P ) + (1− α)I(mQ).
The fourth equality follows from the fact that both αQxh+(1−αQ)xl and P are in ∆(∆(X )),
and part (b) of Lemma 4.
Next, define %∗ on ∆([0, 1]n) as follows: For any P,Q ∈ ∆(F),
mP %∗ mQ if αP + (1− α)R % αQ+ (1− α)R (10)
for any R ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ (0, 1]. Note that if there is another lottery P ′ such thatmP ′ = mP ,
by FOSD, αP +(1−α)R ∼ αP ′+(1−α)R. Hence, %∗ is well defined. We have the following
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observations.
Lemma 7 The following statements are true: (a) %∗ is reflexive and transitive, and for
any m ∈ ∆([0, 1]n), {m′ ∈ ∆([0, 1]n) : m′ %∗ m} and {m′ ∈ ∆([0, 1]n) : m %∗ m′} are
closed, (b) for any P,Q,R ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ (0, 1), mP %∗ mQ implies αmP + (1− α)mR %∗
αmQ+(1−α)mR, and (c) for any P ∈ ∆(F) and Q ∈ ∆(∆(X )), P % Q implies mP %∗ mQ.
Proof. For part (a), reflexivity and transitivity of %∗ are immediate. Since ∆([0, 1]n) is
Polish, to verify the continuity property of %∗, it suffices to show that for any two sequences
of lotteries {Pl} and {Ql} such that Pl converges to P , Ql converges to Q, and mPl %∗ mQl for
any l ∈ N, we have mP %∗ mQ. Fixing any R ∈ ∆(F) and α ∈ (0, 1], since αPl + (1−α)R %
αQl + (1− α)R, by Continuity of %, we have αP + (1− α)R % αQ+ (1− α)R.
For part (b), take any R′ ∈ ∆(F) and β ∈ (0, 1]. We want to show that if mP %∗ mQ,
we have
β(αP + (1− α)R) + (1− β)R′ % β(αQ+ (1− α)R) + (1− β)R′.
To see this, we only need to notice that mP %∗ mQ and
β(αP + (1− α)R) + (1− β)R′ = αβP + (1− αβ)
(
β(1− α)






β(αQ+ (1− α)R) + (1− β)R′ = αβQ+ (1− αβ)
(
β(1− α)






To show (c), take any R ∈ ∆(F). For any α ∈ (0, 1], Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that
I(mαP+(1−α)R) = I(αmP + (1− α)mR)
≥ αI(mP ) + (1− α)I(mR)
≥ αI(mQ) + (1− α)I(mR)
= I(mαQ+(1−α)R).
46
Consider the vector space of continuous functions from [0, 1]n to R, C([0, 1]n), endowed
with the sup norm. According to the above lemma and Dubra et al. (2004), there exist a






V dm′ for every V ∈ V.
Without loss of generality, assume that for every V ∈ V, V (0, . . . , 0) = 0 and V (1, . . . , 1) = 1.
Next, we show that every V in V satisfies a few properties. For any (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n,
let δ(α1,...,αn) denote the Dirac measure on (α1, . . . , αn).
Lemma 8 Every V in V is weakly increasing, concave, and satisfies V (λα1+(1−λ)β, . . . , λαn+
(1− λ)β) = λV (α1, . . . , αn) + (1− λ)β for any (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n and β, λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. For any (α1, . . . , αn), (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ [0, 1]n, we can find some f and g such that
u(f) = (α1, . . . , αn) and u(g) = (β1, . . . , βn). SOSD implies that for any R ∈ ∆(F),
λ ∈ [0, 1], and γ ∈ (0, 1],
γ(λf +sw (1− λ)g) + (1− γ)R % γ(λf + (1− λ)g) + (1− γ)R.
This means that λf +sw (1− λ)g %∗ λf + (1− λ)g, and hence δ(λα1+(1−λ)β1,...,λαn+(1−λ)βn) %∗
λδ(α1,...,αn) + (1− λ)δ(β1,...,βn). Therefore, for any V ∈ V,
V (λα1 + (1− λ)β1, . . . , λαn + (1− λ)βn) ≥ λV (α1, . . . , αn) + (1− λ)V (β1, . . . , βn).
Following similar steps, FOSD implies that every V ∈ V is weakly increasing. Finally,
suppose p ∈ ∆(X ) satisfies u(p) = β. Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts
implies that for any R ∈ ∆(F) and γ ∈ (0, 1],
γ(λf +sw (1− λ)p) + (1− γ)R ∼ γ(λf + (1− λ)p) + (1− γ)R;
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that is, δ(λα1+(1−λ)β,...,λαn+(1−λ)β) ∼∗ λδ(α1,...,αn) + (1 − λ)δ(β,...,β). This means that for any
V ∈ V,
V (λα1 + (1− λ)β, . . . , λαn + (1− λ)β) = λV (α1, . . . , αn) + (1− λ)V (β, . . . , β).
We only need to show that V (β, . . . , β) = β. According to our construction of u, u(p) = β
implies that βxh + (1 − β)xl ∼ p. By Lemma 3, we have βxh + (1 − β)xl ∼∗ p. Thus, for
any V ∈ V,
βV (1, . . . , 1) + (1− β)V (0, . . . , 0) = β = V (β, . . . , β).
The lemma above implies that every V ∈ V is positively homogeneous (let β = 0) and
V ([0, 1]n) = [0, 1]. Therefore, V is bounded. Below, we show that V is compact.
Lemma 9 V is compact.
Proof. Since [0, 1]n is Polish, C([0, 1]n) is also Polish (see Chapter 3.19 of Aliprantis and
Border (2006)). Therefore, to show that V is compact, we only need to show that it is
sequentially compact. Since [0, 1]n is compact and V is bounded, by the Arzelá–Ascoli
theorem, if we can show that V is equicontinuous, we know that for any sequence in V, there
is a subsequence that converges in sup norm. Of course, the limit is in V, because C([0, 1]n)
is complete, V is closed, and hence V is complete.
Suppose V is not equicontinuous. Then, there exists some (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ [0, 1]n such that
for some ε > 0, for any ω ∈ (0, 1), we can find some (βω1 , . . . , βωn ) and Vω ∈ V such that
|Vω(βω1 , . . . , βωn )− Vω(α1, . . . , αn)| > ε, (11)
in which (βω1 , . . . , β
ω
n ) is within the ω-neighborhood of (α1, . . . , αn). Take a sequence of{(
β
ωj





such that (11) holds and ωj converges to zero as j goes to infinity.
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Suppose αi = 0 or 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Because we have V (λα1+(1−λ)γ, . . . , λαn+
(1 − λ)γ) = λV (α1, . . . , αn) + (1 − λ)γ for every V ∈ V and λ, γ ∈ (0, 1), we can multiply








by λ and add some (γ, . . . , γ) to them so that (i) λαi +
(1 − λ)γ ∈ (0, 1) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and (ii) we have a new version of (11) with the
right-hand side being λε. Therefore, without loss of generality, assume that αi ∈ (0, 1) for
every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, we can also assume without loss of generality that for any j ∈ N,
β
ωj
i > 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since V (γ, . . . , γ) = γ and V is weakly increasing for any V ∈ V, we know that
Vωj(α1, . . . , αn) > 0. Since every V ∈ V is bounded by 1, (11) implies that for each j ∈N,
∣∣Vωj(α1, . . . , αn)− Vωj (βωj1 , . . . , βωjn )∣∣










Vωj(α1, . . . , αn)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε. (12)






























must converge to 1. We have a contradiction.
Note that for any V ∈ V and P ∈ ∆(F),
∫
F




Next, we show that





If we can show this, according to the proof of Lemma 4,




V (u(f)) dP (13)
represents %.
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Proof. Let α := minV ∈V
∫
[0,1]n
V dmP . First, we show that I(mP ) ≤ α. If α = 1, the
inequality holds according to part (c) of Lemma 4. If α < 1, let β be an arbitrary number
such that α < β < 1. We can find some p ∈ ∆(X ) such that u(p) = β (see the proof of
Lemma 4). Then, for some V ∈ V,
∫
[0,1]n
V dmP < β = V (β, . . . , β);
that is, mP 6%∗ δ(β,...,β) = mp. By part (c) of Lemma 7, this implies that p  P . Therefore,
I(δ(β,...,β)) = β > I(m
P ). Let β converge to α. We have I(mP ) ≤ α.
Second, we show that I(mP ) ≥ α. We can find some q ∈ ∆(X ) such that u(q) = α. Then,
according to the representation of %∗, mP %∗ δ(α,...,α) = mq. According to the definition of
%∗, P % q; that is, I(mP ) ≥ u(q) = α.
Notice that each V ∈ V induces a preference over F . Because V is continuous, weakly
increasing, concave, and satisfies V (λα1 + (1− λ)β, . . . , λαn + (1− λ)β) = λV (α1, . . . , αn) +




S u(f) dµ for some unique compact and convex subset of ∆(S).
Lemma 11 For any V ∈ V, there exists a unique compact and convex M ⊂ ∆(S) such that
V (u(f)) = min
µ∈M
∫
S u(f) dµ for any f ∈ F .
Proof. Denote the preference induced by V on F by %V ; that is, f %V g if V (u(f)) ≥
V (u(g)). The only mixture operation considered for %V on F is state-wise randomization,
+sw. We know that (F ,+sw) is a mixture space. Clearly, %V is complete and transitive,
and for any act f , the sets {g ∈ F : g %V f} and {g ∈ F : f %V g} are closed because V
is continuous and, as shown previously, F is a closed subset of ∆(F). Concavity of V and
V (λα1 + (1 − λ)β, . . . , λαn + (1 − λ)β) = λV (α1, . . . , αn) + (1 − λ)β imply that constant
acts preserve State-wise Independence, and that for any f, g and α ∈ (0, 1), f %V g implies
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αf +sw (1 − α)g %V g. Lastly, FOSD implies that if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, fi %V gi, then
f %V g. Therefore, we can apply the results of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to show that
there exists a unique compact and convex set MV of probability measures over S such that




u(f) dµ for any f ∈ F . (14)
The compactness of MV follows from the fact that MV is a closed subset of the compact set
∆(S).
The proof of Lemma 11 in fact implies a stronger result: There is a bijection φ (defined
by (14)) from the collection of nonempty compact and convex subsets of ∆(S) to the set of
functions in C([0, 1]n) that satisfy properties described in Lemma 8. Let M = {φ−1(V ) :
V ∈ V}. The next lemma is not needed to prove Theorem 2, but will be useful for Theorem
3.
Lemma 12 M is convex.
Proof. Take any λ ∈ [0, 1] and M1,M2 ∈ M. Let Vj = φ(Mj), j = 1, 2. The following
equality holds:





for any f ∈ F , in which λM1 + (1− λ)M2 = {λµ1 + (1− λ)µ2 : µ1 ∈M1 and µ2 ∈M2}. We
only need to prove that λM1 + (1− λ)M2 is convex and compact.
Since M1 and M2 are convex, proving that λM1 + (1 − λ)M2 is convex is straight-
forward. To prove that it is compact, take an arbitrary sequence in λM1 + (1 − λ)M2,
{λµk1 + (1 − λ)µk2}∞k=1. Note that M1 and M2 are compact. Since {µk1}∞k=1 has a conver-
gent subsequence, without loss of generality, let {λµk1 + (1 − λ)µk2}∞k=1 be a sequence such












Since λV1 + (1− λ)V2 ∈ V, λM1 + (1− λ)M2 = φ−1(λV1 + (1− λ)V2) ∈M.
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Because K(∆(S)) is compact (Theorem 3.85 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), if we can
show that M is closed, M is compact. This is implied by the following lemma.
Lemma 13 M is closed.
Proof. Take an arbitrary sequence {Mj}∞j=1 in M that converges to some M ∈ K(∆(S)).
Since M ∈ K(∆(S)), M is a closed subset of the compact set ∆(S) and hence M is compact.
Verifying that M is convex is standard.
Let Vj = φ(Mj) ∈ V for each j ∈ N. Since V is compact, we know that {Vj}∞j=1 has a
convergent subsequence {Vjk}∞k=1 whose limit V is in V.
By definition, for any f ∈ F ,





We need to prove that M = φ−1(V ) ∈ M. If this is not true, since M is compact and
convex, according to the uniqueness of the MEU representation, there must be some g ∈ F




∣∣∣∣ = ε > 0.
Because Vjk(u(g)) = min
µ∈Mjk
∫
S u(g) dµ for each k, Vjk(u(g)) converges to V (u(g)) as k goes
to infinity, and u is a continuous function defined on a compact set, even when k is large,




S u(g) dµ < V (u(g))), or some µjk ∈ Mjk that is sufficiently distant from all priors in
M (in the case of min
µ∈M
∫
S u(g) dµ > V (u(g))). Thus, {Mjk}∞k=1 does not converge to M . We
have a contradiction.
To summarize, we have shown that if % satisfies the axioms in Theorem 2, % has a
DMEU representation (M, u) in which M is a compact and convex collection of compact
and convex subsets of ∆(S). This will be called a DMEU∗ representation in Theorem 3.
Proving the necessity of the axioms is standard. We only verify FOSD and SOSD below.
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Suppose

















S u(f) dµ : M ∈M
}
is compact.
We verify FOSD for a more general representation described in (13), in which V is
compact and every V ∈ V is continuous and weakly increasing. This representation nests
the DMEU representation as a special case. Thus, if we can show that every % that has
such a representation satisfies FOSD, then whenever % has a DMEU representation, FOSD
must also hold.
Suppose P first-order stochastically dominates Q. For each V ∈ V,
∫
V (u(f)) dP ≥∫




V (u(f)) dP =
∫
V P (u(f)) dP ≥
∫




which means that FOSD holds.
Next, let Q be a mean-preserving spread of P ; that is, P = β[αf +sw (1−α)g]+ (1−β)R
and Q = β[αf + (1− α)g] + (1− β)R for some β ∈ [0, 1] and R ∈ ∆(F). We need to verify
that W (P ) ≥ W (Q). We have



































































































Therefore, W (P ) ≥ W (Q).

Proof of Theorem 3: The proof of Theorem 2 shows that we can find a continuous
expected utility function u : ∆(X ) → R and a compact and convex set V̂ ⊂ C([0, 1]n) such






V dm′ for every V ∈ V̂;
(ii) for each V ∈ V̂, there exists a unique compact and convex set φ−1(V ) ⊂ ∆(S) such that
V (u(f)) = min
µ∈φ−1(V )
∫




is a DMEU∗ representation of % in which
M̂ =
{
φ−1(V ) : V ∈ V̂
}
. The function φ is the bijection defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
Note that %∗ defined in (10) is different from the expected utility core we define in Section
3.1, because %∗ is a binary relation on ∆([0, 1]n) and the expected utility core is a binary
relation on ∆(F). However, with an abuse of notation, letting %∗ also denote the expected
utility core of %, we immediately have P %∗ Q ⇐⇒ mP %∗ mQ for any P,Q ∈ ∆(F),
according to the definition of the expected utility core.
We know that for any V ∈ V̂ and P ∈ ∆(F),
∫
F V (u(f)) dP =
∫
[0,1]n
V dmP . Therefore,
for any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), P %∗ Q if and only if for every V ∈ V̂,
∫
F




























of % satisfies part 2 of the theorem.
Suppose there is another DMEU∗ representation (M, v) of %. Since both u and v are
expected utility representations of % on ∆(X ), there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that
v = αu+ β. Because
























= αWM,u(P ) + β,
(M, v) is a DMEU∗ representation of % if and only if (M, u) is a DMEU∗ representation of
%. Thus, without loss of generality, let v = u. Let
V = {φ(M) ∈ C([0, 1]n) : M ∈M}.
Using arguments similar to the proof of Lemmas 12 and 13, we can verify that V is compact
and convex.
We first prove that M̂ is unique. Suppose (M, u) also satisfies part 2 of the theorem.
Then, for any P,Q ∈ ∆(F), the following three statements are equivalent: (i) P %∗ Q; (ii) for
every V ∈ V̂,
∫
F V (u(f)) dP ≥
∫
F V (u(f)) dQ; and (iii) for every V ∈ V,
∫
F V (u(f)) dP ≥∫











cone (V) + {γ1[0,1]n}γ∈R
)
. (15)
Note that V′ :=cl
(
cone (V) + {γ1[0,1]n}γ∈R
)
∩ {V ∈ C([0, 1]n) : V (λ, . . . , λ) = λ for
any λ ∈ [0, 1]} = co(V) = V. To show this, since V ⊂ V′, we only need to show that
V ∈ V′ ⇒ V ∈ V. Suppose V is the limit of a sequence {θkVk + γk1[0,1]n}∞k=1, in which
θk ≥ 0, γk ∈ R, and Vk ∈co(V) for each k ∈ N. Because V ∈ V′, it satisfies V (λ, . . . , λ) = λ
for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, V (0, . . . , 0) = 0 implies that γk must converge to 0. This together
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with the fact that V (1, . . . , 1) = 1 implies that θk must converge to 1. Therefore, it must be
true that V ∈ co(V). Since V is compact and convex, co(V) = V. The same arguments hold
for V̂. Then, (15) implies that V̂ = V. Since φ is a bijection, M̂ =M.
Next, without assuming that the DMEU∗ representation (M, u) of % satisfies part 2 of
the theorem, we show that M̂ ⊂M. First, define %′ on ∆(F) as follows: P %′ Q if
∫
F
V (u(f)) dP ≥
∫
F
V (u(f)) dQ for every V ∈ V.















































in which M(P ) ∈ M is a worst-case scenario for P . Therefore, P %′ Q ⇒ P % Q.
By Proposition 22 of Cerreia-Vioglio (2009), V̂ ⊂ V. Since φ is a bijection, this implies
M̂ ⊂M.

Proof of Theorem 4: We only prove the sufficiency of the axioms. Part 1 of Lemma
1 shows that for any lottery P , P ∼ fP . Therefore, for any DMEU representation of %,













it must be true that W (P ) = W (fP ). For an act f , we know that





in which M =cl(
⋃
M∈MM). Therefore,



















Since ∆(S) is compact, M is compact.

Proof of Theorem 5: We only show that if% has a DMEU representation and satisfies
Independence, then it has an Ex Post MEU representation. Since Weak Order, Continuity,
and Independence hold, there exists a continuous expected utility function V ′ : F → R such
that





Define u(p) = W ep(p) for any p ∈ ∆(X ). In the proof of Theorem 2, we use xl to denote
one of the worst lotteries and xh one of the best lotteries. Since FOSD holds, whenever two
acts f and g satisfy W ep(fi) ≥ W ep(gi) for any i, W ep(f) ≥ W ep(g). Therefore, there exists
a function V ∗ : [u(xl), u(xh)]
n → R such that
V ∗(u(f1), . . . , u(fn)) = V
′(f)
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for each f ∈ F . Notice that for any p ∈ ∆(X ),
V ∗(u(p), . . . , u(p)) = V ′(p) = W ep(p) = u(p). (16)
Futhermore, due to Continuity and Indifference to Mixture Timing of Constant Acts, for
any p ∈ ∆(X ),












in which W ep(p) is the utility of a degenerate lottery that yields the constant act p with




is the utility of the randomization over consequences according
to p. To show that (17) holds, we first verify that it holds when p has finite support, and
then we apply Continuity to the case in which p may not have finite support. Since W is
continuous, (16) and (17) imply that u is a continuous expected utility representation of %
on ∆(X ).
We know that % has a DMEU representation (M, v). Since both u and v are expected
utility representations of % on ∆(X ), v is equal to some positive affine transformation of
u. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that %’s DMEU representation is
(M, u); that is,












represents %. Note that for any P , αPxh + (1−αP )xl ∼ P , as shown in the proof of Lemma
4. We have W (P ) = αPu(xh) + (1− αP )u(xl) = W ep(P ). In particular, for any f ∈ F ,





in which M =cl(
⋃








dP . Since ∆(S) is
compact, M is compact.
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
Comparative Statics: Below is some comparative static result for the DMEU repre-
sentation. Suppose there are two individuals whose preferences over lotteries are %1 and %2,
respectively. If %i has a DMEU representation (Mi, ui), we use Mi to denote
⋃
M∈MiM ,
i = 1, 2. The proposition below provides a sufficient condition for when the individual with
%2 always thinks that randomization is less effective in eliminating the effect of ambiguity
than the individual with %1. The necessary condition may also be established, but we will
need to focus on DMEU∗ representations with the unique minimal set of scenarios.
Proposition 1 Suppose %1 and %2 have DMEU representations (M1, u) and (M2, u), re-
spectively, and M1 = M2. If for any M1 ∈M1, there exists an M2 ∈M2 such that M1 ⊂M2,
then P %2 f implies P %1 f for any lottery P and act f .










dP . For each M1 ∈M1, let M2(M1) denote an element of
M2 that contains M1. Since the two individuals share the same u and M1 = M2, they must
also share the same evaluation of every act. Then, the proposition follows from
W1(P ) = min
M∈M1
∫
F
(
min
µ∈M
∫
S
u(f) dµ
)
dP
=
∫
F
(
min
µ∈M(P )
∫
S
u(f) dµ
)
dP
≥
∫
F
(
min
µ∈M2(M(P ))
∫
S
u(f) dµ
)
dP
≥ min
M∈M2
∫
F
(
min
µ∈M
∫
S
u(f) dµ
)
dP
= W2(P ).

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